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CoRPORATIONs-SEPARATION OF THE VoTING PowER FROM LEGAL
AND BENEFICIAL OwNERSHIP OF CORPORATE STOCK-The Supreme
Court of Michigan recently decided the case of Ecclestone v. Indialantic,
Inc.,1 the important facts being as follows: in June, r942, defendant
Emmons, owner of 45r shares of the common stock of Indialantic, Inc.,
· a Florida corporation, transferred his entire holding to the Detroit
Orthopedic Clinic in payment of an antecedent debt, reserving to himself,
however, the sole right to vote the stock until the assets of the corporation
were substantially liquidated. In March, r946, with notice of this
reservation of the right to vote, the plaintiff purchased all of these shares
from the Clinic and thereby acquired, when added to others previously
purchased, ownership of a majority of the outstanding shares of the
Indialantic corporation. Defendant Emmons having refused to cancel
his right to vote and defendant Indialantic, Inc., having declined to
transfer the stock without reservation of the voting power, plaintiff
brought this suit in chancery for a declaration of his right to vote the
stock in question. On appeal, the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
bill was affirmed on the following grounds: ( r) that this separation of
the voting power from stock ownership was justified by the presence of
a property interest to be conserved and a definite policy of the corporation
to be carried out; and (2) that the services rendered by defendant
Emmons were so valuable and important to the welfare of the corporation, and their continuation so desirable, that the power to vote, being
beneficial not only to Emmons but also to the corporation itself, was a
power coupled with an interest which was not affected by the sale of the
stock to the plaintiff.
The validity of voting agreements, using the term in its broadest
sense to include proxies, pooling agreements, voting combinations and
voting trusts, has been a major problem in the courts for nearly threequarters of a century. To say that today the conflict and confusion of the
decisions are justifiable as a reasonable difference of judicial opinion is
an unwarranted rationalization, especially in view of the fact that a
judicially legislated "public policy" is the principal source of trouble.
It is not within the scope of this comment to consider the validity of
voting agreements in general. Too many factors are involved. For
1

319 Mich. 248, 29 N.W. (2d) 679 (1947).
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example, much may depend on who is challenging the validity of a
particular agreement, whether a party thereto or a stockholder outside
the agreement; 2 statutes in for.ce in the particular jurisdiction are of
course of the utmost importance; 8 defective instrumentation or lack of
consideration may be cause for invalidating an agreement; 4 the purpose
or object for which a voting agreement was made may be decisive, as, for
instance, where fraud or other illegal action is contemplated in contrast
to action beneficial to the corporation or the stockholders as a whole; 5
whether an agreement purports to be revocable or irrevocable, and
whether there has been a separation of the voting power from stock
ownership or merely an advance comn;i.itment of the vote, must be considered in the light of the "public policy" of the jurisdiction toward the
particular voting agreement. Therefore, except for purposes of background, comparison or analogy, only those voting agreements which
purport to separate irrevocably the voting power from both legal and
beneficial ownership of corporate stock, which are not defective in form
or for want of consideration, which do not involve actual fraud or other
illegal purpose and whose validity is challenged in a controversy between
the parties thereto or their privies, will be considered.

I
"Public Policy"
Initially, the rapid growth of the corporate form of business, the
economic evils and benefits of separating the right to vote from legal
or beneficial ownership of corporate stock, and the practical business need
for some sort of voting control device could not readily be foreseen.
Therefore, the courts understandably looked with distrust upon an
agreement which made possible the complete control of property in a
business enterprise •without the incidents of risk normally assumed by
the entrepreneur. In the earlier cases this distrust usually resulted in
sweeping declarations of a "public policy" which condemned virtually
all separations of voting power from either legal or beneficial ownership
2
White v. Thomas Inflatable Tire Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 178, 28 A. 75 (1893);
Chapman v. Bates, 61 N.J. Eq. 658, 47 A. 638 (1900); Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, Inc.,
(C.C.A. 8th, 1928) 25 F. (2d) 783 at 788; Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870);
Tuller, ''Voting Agreements of Stock," 44 AM. L. REv. 663 at 682 (1910).
8
See 5 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed.,§ 2080, note 4 (1931), for compilation
of states having statutes authorizing voting trusts. In addition, many states have statutes
limiting the duration of proxies. See also, Brigers v. First Nat. Bank, I 52 N.C. 282, 67
S.E. 770 (1910); Simpson v. Neilson, 77 Cal. App. 297, 246 P. 342 (1926).
4
Warren v. Pim, 66 N.J. Eq. 353, 59 A. 773 (1904); 5 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP.,
perm. ed., § 2079 ( I 93 I) •
5
Reed v. Bank of Newburgh, 6 Paige (N.Y.) 337 (1837); McClean v. Bradley,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1924) 299 F. 379; 5 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., §§ 2081-2084
(1931).
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of stock, not because the voting agreement or trust itself was invalid but
rather because of the injurious effect such an agreement was supposed to
have on the rights of other stockholders and on trade and the public
welfare in general.6
The reason most frequently given was that a sort of fiduciary relationship exists between stockholders and, consequently, each stockholder
is entitled to have the benefit of the judgment of every other stockholder
and to have the affairs of the corporation managed by responsible persons
who stand to lose directly from faulty or ill-advised decisions on corporate policy or planning.7 In theory this reasoning is perhaps tenable,
but in practice it deteriorates, primarily because of the known fact that
.. a very substantial percentage of stockholders, especially those in large
corporations with capital stock widely held, do not vote at stockholders'
meetings either in person or by proxy.8 But the reasoning further breaks
down because it fails to recognize the possibility that a voting agreement
may be beneficial to all the stockholders. For example, it may provide a
stabilizing influence and make feasible long-range planning and policy,
or it may serve to persuade creditors of a corporation in financial distress
to forsake the race of diligence in return for a voice in the management.9
A second reason sometimes offered was that an irrevocable separation of the voting power from stock ownership constitutes an unlawful
restraint on alienation of property.10 This appears to be a doubtful
conclusion in both law and fact and was never seriously considered. Still
another reason given, when the facts of the case justified it, was that a
stockholder could not sell his right to vote for a consideration personal
to himself or, for the same consideration, agree to cast the vote himself.11
An analogy has been drawn between sale of the vote in corporate elections
and the sale of the vote by electors in a democracy.12 However, the writer
has been unable to find a single case in which this doctrine was essential
6
Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553, 24 A. 32 (1891); Harvey v. Linville
Improvement Co., II8 N.C. 693, 24 S.E. 489 (1896); State v. Standard Oil Co., 49
Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892); 2 THOMPSON, CoRPORATioNs, 3d ed., § 991
(1927); Wormser, "The Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling Agreements,"
18 YALE L.J. 123 (1918).
7
Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553, 24 A. 32 (1891); Tuller, ''Voting
Agreements of Stock," 44 AM. L. REv. 663 at 666 et seq. (1910); Smith, "Limitations
on the Validity of Voting Trusts," 22 CoL. L. REv. 627 (1922).
8
Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, Inc., (C.C.A. 8th, 1928) 25 F. (2d) 783 at 786;
Hornstein, "Corporate Control and Private Property Rules;' 92 UNiv. PA. L. REv. I
(1943).
9
Mobile&. 0. R. Co. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, 12 S. 723 (1892).
10
Moses v. Scott, 84 Ala. 608, 4 S. 742 (1887).
11
Dieckmann v. Robyn, 162 Mo. App. 67, 141 S.W. 717 (19II); Brady v. Bean,
221 Ill. App. 279 (1921); Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry. Co., II5 Cal. 584, 47 P.
582 (1897); 5 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed.,§ 2065 (1931).
12
Baldwin, "Voting Trusts," I YALE L.J. 1 (1891).
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to the decision. Invariably present were other grounds such as fraud,
illegal purpose or illegal restriction on the discretion of the directors, on
which the decision could have been based. Furthermore, the analogy
itself is faulty, not only because democracy is not inherent in private
corporations, but also because the right to vote in corporate elections,
being the right to control the use of corporate property, is a property
right and as such should be subject to property law and not necessarily
to election law.
The rising tide of business necessity wore into the foundations of this
"public policy" barrier erected in the earlier cases, and it soon became
apparent that there was no obvious and overwhelming reason for judicially condemning virtually all separations of voting power from legal
or beneficial ownership as invalid per se.13 In some jurisdictions previous
broad declarations of "public policy," to a large degree dicta, were
modified. As other jurisdictions ruled on the question for the first
time, the weight of authority became, at least where the voting power
was separated from only the beneficial ownership of stock, that the
separation of the voting power is justified when there is a "property
interest to conserve, some definite policy in the interest of the corporation
to be carried out, some beneficial interest of the stockholders to be
served, or some purpose not unlawful of an advantageous character to
the stockholders to be e:ffectuated." 14
It is essential to recognize, however, in what situations the attack
on this "public policy" made progress. When the old common law
restriction on voting by proxy was eliminated by statute, no questions of
policy against separating voting power from legal or beneficial ownership of stock were raised.15 Nor were such "policy" questions raised
when voting combinations or pooling agreements, not involving a transfer of the legal ownership of stock, were upheld on the theory that
stockholders could validly unite and pool their strength by committing
their vote in advance.16 The principal inroad was made in the field of
voting trusts where, in addition to the right to vote, the legal title to the
stock is transferred to the trustee, thereby severing the voting power
from the beneficial ownership only. Here the argument has often prevailed that "public policy," if any, is against separating the right to vote
13

Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, Inc., (C.C.A. 8th, 1928) 25 F. (2d) 783; Carnegie
Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co., III Va. I at 20, 68 S.E. 412 (1910).
14
Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398 at 402-403, 76 A. 103 (1910).
15 General acceptance of the theory that the proxyholder is merely an agent of
the stockholder eliminated the argument that a separation of the voting power is authorized by a statute granting the right to vote by proxy.
16
The stockholder was considered as personally exercising his right to vote even
though he had committed himself in advance to vote as the majority of the stockholders
in the pool should decide. See, Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry. Co., II5 Cal. 584,
47 P. 582 (1897); White v. Snell, 35 Utah 434, 100 P. 927 (1909); 46 MxcH. L.
REv. 70 (1947).
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from the legal ownership, i.e., from the stock itself, and not against
separating the right to vote from beneficial ownership alone.11 Whether
or not this distinction has any merit in so far as non-statutory "public
policy" is concerned, it does harmonize with the contention that strict
construction of a statute which gives to each "stockholder" the right to
vote does not permit finding a legislative intent that the right to vote
may be separated from the legal ownership of stock and exercised by one
not a "stockholder"; for a voting trustee, having legal title to stock under
a valid voting trust, does qualify as a "stockholder.ms It has been forcefully argued that the conflict in voting trust cases over the question of
"public policy" lies primarily in dicta and that almost all these cases can
be reconciled on their facts ( e.g., fraud or illegal purpose present) or on
the basis of statutory construction.19 It is sufficient for present purposes
to note that in the absence of statutory authorization some courts have
upheld voting trusts on the theory of the distinction set out above, viz.,
that "public policy" is not against the separation of the voting power
from the beneficial ownership of stock but rather against separation from
the stock itself; 20 that other courts have upheld voting trusts on the
theory that a valid trust has been created against which there is no
opposing "public policy;" 21 and that still other courts have made no
distinction between the form of stock ownership from which the voting
power is separated and have struck down voting trusts with the expression, though perhaps dictum, of a hostile "public policy." 22
In the principal case the court made no attempt to categorize the
voting agreement in issue. Conceivably it could be termed a reservation
of the voting power by defendant Emmons, a sale of the voting power
by the Detroit Orthopedic Clinic or an irrevocable proxy granted by the
clinic; but in whatever category it is placed, the net result is that the
voting power has been, for all practical purposes, permanently separated
from both legal and beneficial ownership of the stock. The real difficulty
in the principal case is to discover the court's conception of "public policy"
in Michigan toward such voting agreements. 23 Although not definitely
17

Clark v. Foster, 98 Wash. 241, 167 P. 908 (1917); 5 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP.,
perm. ed., § 2065 (1931).
18
Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet and Irrigated Land Co. v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co.,
(C.C.A. 8th, 1909) 173 F. 601; Babcock v. Chicago Rys. Co., 325 Ill. 16, 155 N.E.
773 (1927); Clark v. Foster, 98 Wash. 241, 167 P. 908 (1917).
19
Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co., I I I Va. 1, 68 S.E. 412 (1910);
Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, Inc., ( C.C.A. 8th, I 928) 2 5 F. ( 2d) 78 3 at 787; 5 FLETCHER,
CYc. CoRP., perm. ed.,§ 2078 (1931).
20
See note 17, supra.
21
Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 55 N.E. 809 (1900).
22
See note 6, supra.
23
It is quite possible that there was a conflict of laws question in the principal case
and that the law and "public policy" of Florida should govern, but the point was not
considered by the court.
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stated, the-tone of the decision and the textual material quoted therein
indicate that there is a "public policy" in Michigan against the separation
of the right to vote from the beneficial ownership of stock but that such
a separation is justified when there is a property interest to conserve or
some definite policy in the interest of the corporation to be carried out.
In other words, there is a rebuttable presumption against the validity of
such an agreement which must be overcome by the party asserting its
validity.
In justifying the separation of the voting power in the principal case,
the court found such a "property interest" and a "definite policy." Exactly what property interest there was to be conserved is not clear. The
opinion suggests that if the corporation was indebted to defendant
Emmons for services rendered prior to the time the agreement reserving
the power to vote was executed, then retention of the voting power was
permissible as security for such creditor's rights. The record indicates
that prior to the present litigation defendant Emmons had been compensated for services rendered before the agreement was executed. The
opinion also suggests that if defendant Emmons performed services for
the corporation subsequent to the execution of the agreement, reservation
of the voting power was permissible as security for payment therefor.
Future compensation for services yet to be rendered is certainly a new
concept of a "property interest" to be conserved, and one of dubious
merit .. With respect to the "definite policy" of the corporation to be
carried out, both the opinion and the record fail to indicate anything more
than that defendant Emmons had performed valuable services for the
corporation in the past. On this showing, surely it would be difficult to
contend that either a property interest to be conserved or a definite policy
of the corporation to be carried out "affirmatively appears," 24 so as to
overcome the presumption of invalidity. Has the court merely paid lipservice to a questionable "public policy" now too well established to
be ignored?
In developing its opinion the court quoted considerable textual material which pointed up the modern tendency to take a more liberal
attitude toward voting trusts and to condition their validity on the
existence of a legitimate purpose or objective rather than on an immutable "public policy." The fact remains, however, that a valid voting
trust cannot be created without legal title to the stock being transferred
to the trustee.25 Unless the Michigan Supreme Court is willing to assert
that the separation of legal ownership from voting power is immaterial
to "public policy," the policy implications in voting trust cases do not lend
24

Cone v. Russell, 48 N.J. Eq. 208 at 216, 21 A. 847 (1891).
This is a general rule of trust law, but, in addition, both Michigan and Florida
statutes authorizing voting trusts require that legal title to the stock pass to the trustee.
See, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 21.34; Fla. Stat. (1941) § 612.19.
25
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support to a decision sustaining a voting agreement similar to the one
found in the principal case.
Assuming that the legislature has not indicated a policy restricting
separation of the voting power from legal or beneficial ownership of
corporate stock, is there any justification today for a condemning "public
policy" being recognized independently by the judiciary? It is submitted
that there is not, for unless the reasons therefor are clear and convincing,
courts are not warranted in evolving new or retaining old concepts of
"public policy" on which to base their decisions. Considering the weight
of judicial opinion supporting agreements which separate the voting
power, the practical need for some sort of voting control device, the
action of many state legislatures sanctioning voting trusts,2° the ability
to create irrevocable proxies, and the common statutory provisions for
nonvoting classes of corporate stock, one becomes very doubtful whether
a "public policy" exists which is so obvious and overwhelming as to
warrant independent judicial recognition. This would seem to be true
whether or not the voting power is separated from legal ownership in
addition to beneficial ownership, unless the transfer of the bare legal title
to the person having the right to vote is an element of form important
enough to be transformed into a matter of "public policy." Although the
writer has been unable to find another case which squares with the principal case involving a sale of the complete legal and beneficial ownership
of corporate stock while reserving the right to vote, it is believed that
the court reached the correct decision, but for improper reasons. Should
not the court have reasoned that the power to vote in corporate elections
is a power or a property right21 which may exist independently of the
stock from which it arises, that there is no "public policy" against separating the right to vote from stock ownership except one expressed
by the legislature, and that the voting agreement between defendant
Emmons and the Clinic, neither lacking in consideration nor tainted
with fraud or other illegal purpose, is valid?

II
Power Coupled With An Interest
In addition to the "public policy" argument, plaintiff asserted that
the right of defendant Emmons to vote the stock in question was a mere
proxy and, as such, revocable. Without specifically deciding whether the
agreement in the principal case constituted a proxy, the court answered
plaintiff's argument by holding that the power of defendant Emmons
26

See note 3, supra.
Brown v. McLanahan, (C.C.A. 4th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 703; Carnegie Trust
Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co., I I I Va. I at 27, 68 S.E. 412 (1910); Hornstein, "Corporate Control and Private Property Rules," 92 UNIV. PA. L. REv. I (1943).
27
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to vote was a power coupled with an interest and therefore an exception
to the general rule that agencies, including proxies, are revocable. But
what is such an interest?
In Arcweld Manufacturing Co. v. Burney,28 cited in the principal
· case, two such interests were described, the first being "an interest in
the subject or thing itself upon which the power is to be exercised,m0 and
the second being a security interest usually given to provide protection
for money advanced or obligations incurred by the agent. The Arcweld
case was reviewed and expanded by the Washington Supreme Court in
a subsequent decision so involving a two-party agreement creating mutual
proxies to take effect on death and executed for the purpose of securing
the control of the corporation to the survivor. Referring to the exact
wording of the Arcweld case as quoted above, the court made a tenuous
distinction between an interest in the "subject" and an interest in the
"thing itself'' upon which the power is to be exercised, stating that either
interest is sufficient to support an irrevocable proxy. Under the facts of
the later decision, the surviving party to the voting agreement, while not
having a legal interest in the "thing itself," the stock, was found to have
an interest in the "subject" on which the power was to be exercised,
which subject was described as the intangible voting rights plus conse:quent control of the corporation. In addition, the scope of the security
type interest which would support an irrevocable proxy was enlarged
in the later decision so that it might be found in any situation where the
purpose to be served by the exercise of the power is the protection or
furtherance of the interest of the proxyholder; and under the facts of the
later case, the proxyholder was found to have such a security interest
since the power to vote was necessary to make the control of the corporation secure.
This extraordinary view adopted by the Supreme Court of Washington seems to have been employed by the Michigan Supreme Court in
the principal case, although the later Washington decision was not cited.
The net result of such a conception of a power coupled with an interest
would seem to be, in so far as proxies are concerned, that whenever a
proxy is supported by consideration and given for a, purpose beneficial to
the holder rather than merely for the purpose of authorizing the holder
to express the view of the stockholder, then the proxy is coupled with
an interest and irrevocable, even though not expressly declared to be
irrevocable. Thus, as in the principal case, a proxy given for a consideration and for the purpose of securing to the holder his position in or
remuneration from the corporation would be coupled with an interest
and irrevocable. Under this concept the conventional view that an
"interest" meant either a property right of the proxy holder in the stock
28

12 Wash. (2d) 212, 121 P. (2d) 350 (1942).
Ibid. at 222.
so State v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wash. (2d) 844, 157 P. (2d) 707 (1945).

29
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itself or security for money advanced by the holder 31 becomes wholly
inadequate. And can we not take the final step and say that in any jurisdiction where the view of the Washington and Michigan Supreme
Courts is adopted, the entire concept of a power coupled with an interest
must be discarded in so far as corporate proxies are concerned? Can we
not say that here again the court in the principal case has paid mere lipservice to a doctrine too well established to be ignored and has, in fact,
reduced the problem of irrevocable proxies to one of ordinary consideration and intent of the parties to the agreement? 32
III
Conclusion
The real problem in this branch of the law concerns the use of voting
agreements as a means of concentrating economic power and perpetuating
control over investment and utilization of corporate assets. No doubt
certain restrictions on the separation of the voting power from legal
or beneficial ownership of corporate stock are called for, but the
determination of what these restrictions should be is for the legislature
to make after a thorough analysis of the economic and social factors
involved. Any attempt by the courts to impose restrictions in piecemeal
fashion without the aid of a complete analysis of the problem, which only
the legislature is capable of undertaking, is bound to be unsatisfactory,
as history well proves. The courts should end their recognition of any
"public policy" against such a separation except one declared by statutes,
and should restrict their activity to invalidating voting agreements for
fraud or other specific illegal purpose. Classification of the right to vote
as a property right which may exist independently would not only eliminate much of the confusion which exists today and make unnecessary
much of the judicial dodging over the questions of "public policy" and
"power coupled with an interest," but it would also place the burden of
developing a comprehensive program for regulating voting agreements
on the legislature, where it belongs.

Richard V. Ehrick, S.Ed.

81 In re Public Industrial Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 398, 168 A. 82 (1933); 2 C.J.S.
(Agency) § 75.
82 For a recent discussion of the revocability of proxies to vote stock, see 159 A.L.R.
307 (1945).

